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Intellectual Property

by Laurence P. Colton*
and Nigamnarayan Acharya**

I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys case law developments in the area of intellectual
property, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks, relevant to
Georgia during the period from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003.
The authors have not attempted to include all cases that touch upon
intellectual property, but instead they have selected some decisions that
are of more significance or interest or that indicate a particular direction
the areas of law may take.
Intellectual property law comprises several discrete yet overlapping
areas of law. The four primary areas are patent, trademark, copyright,
and trade secret.' Patent and copyright law are provided for in the
United States Constitution,2 and thus the cases regarding these two
areas are based on federal law and are gleaned from the U.S. federal
courts. While trademark law has both federal S and state aspects and

* Member in the firm of Technoprop Colton LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. Tufts University
(B.S. ChE, 1982); Emory University (J.D., 1987). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
Registered to practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
** Associate in the firm of Technoprop Colton LLC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Wisconsin-Madison (B.S. in Biochemistry, Molecular Biology, and Political Science, 1998);
Emory University (J.D., 2001). Member, State Bar of Georgia. Registered to practice
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
1. Secondary areas that will not be surveyed in this Article due to space limitations
include trade dress and know how.
2. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution provides that "The Congress shall
have power . . . (8) To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries .... " Authors/Writings refers to copyright, and Inventors/Discoveries
refers to patent.
3. Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution is the Commerce Clause, which
forms the constitutional basis for federal trademark and unfair competition legislation, and
provides that "The Congress shall have Power ... (3) To regulate Commerce with foreign
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thus the cases regarding this area are based on federal or state law, the
cases generally are litigated in the United States federal courts. As
such, this Article will focus on the cases from the federal courts.
II.
A.

PATENT CASES

Claim Construction

The claims of a patent are the equivalent of the metes and bounds of
the protection of the patent-the scope of coverage. 4 As the claim's
scope often can be determinative in a patent infringement action, many
of the appellate cases in patent law are focused on claim construction.
While claim construction is determined from a number of factors, the
words in the claims are given their ordinary meaning unless the
applicant or the patent specification 5 suggests otherwise. As such, in
many of the court cases where claim construction is at issue, the focus
is on instances in which the words in the claims are not given their
ordinary meaning.
First, the prior art's' definition of a term may be given weight over
the dictionary definition in determining the meaning of the term.7 In
Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co.,' the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court's claim construction of a patent claim related to a rechargeable
hydrogen battery, which was based completely on the dictionary
definition of the term "amorphous."9 Defendants argued that the term
"amorphous" should be construed to mean "completely amorphous" as
defined by the dictionary' ° and that defendants did not infringe the
patent because the batteries produced under defendants' licenses did not
use completely amorphous alloys.1 The Federal Circuit determined
that the dictionary definition suggesting a completely amorphous
interpretation was restrictive because the patentee cited prior art during
prosecution of the patent application in which the term "amorphous" was
defined to be less than completely amorphous. 1 Thus, the definition

Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... "
4. The claims are the part of the patent that define the technology that is the
exclusive property of the patentee for the term of the patent.
5. The "specification" is the main body of the patent.
6. "Prior art" is the body of knowledge predating the patent at issue.
7. See Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
8. 351 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
9. Id. at 1367.
10. "Completely" is an arrangement where there is no ordering of molecules. Id.
11. Id. at 1371.
12. Id. at 1368.
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of "amorphous" from the prior art was preferred over the dictionary
definition when constructing the scope of this claim limitation. 3
Next, the use of the terms "first" and "second," without more, in
structural patent claims does not have a temporal meaning. 4 In 3M
Innovative Products Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 5 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's claim construction, which defined the term
"multiple embossed patterns" to include a limitation that the "patterns"
be created sequentially based on the patentee's use of terms "first
pattern" and "second pattern."" As the patentee defined the film of its
adhesive-backed film product for commercial graphics in an entirely
structural manner, the court rejected the argument that use of "first"
and "second" conveyed a temporal arrangement contrary to the plain
language of the claims. 7 The court appeared to be persuaded by the
patentee's broadening of the claim language during the prosecution of
the patent, which also supported a plain-meaning 8construction of the
claim without a sequential-embossment limitation.
One court held that terms in patent claims may be given the definition
understood by persons skilled in the art 9 rather than the dictionary
definition.2" In Merck & Co. v. Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc.,21 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court that Teva's
generic compound ("alendronic acid") infringed on Merck's patents.2 2
After concluding that Merck's patent was valid, the court rejected Teva's
argument that Teva's generic product did not infringe on the patent
claim because the patent called for use of an "acid" while Teva's product
used an "acid salt."" Specifically, while the patent did use the term
"acid," persons skilled in the art understand that the term "acid" refers
to the active agent that would be delivered in the form of a salt.24
Thus, the patent inherently covered an acid salt compound.25

13. Id.
14. See 3M Innovative Prods. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1374 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
15. 350 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
16. Id. at 1374.
17. Id. at 1371-73.
18. Id. at 1372.
19. Like most legal fields, the patent field relies on the hypothetical "person of ordinary
skill in the art" when determining whether a patent is valid. This standard is the rough
equivalent of the reasonable person standard in other legal fields.
20. Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 347 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
21. 347 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
22. Id. at 1368.
23. Id. at 1371-72.
24. Id. at 1372.
25. Id.
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Further, the meaning of terms in patent claims are not limited to the
embodiment shown in the examples of the patent.26 In Glaxo Wellcome,
Inc. v.Andrx Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,2 7 the Federal Circuit reversed the
summary judgment of noninfringement, which was based on an unduly
restrictive construction of the patent claims.2 ' Andrx argued that
Glaxo's patents on a sustained-release formulation of bupropion
hydrochloride (the active ingredient in Wellbutrin® SR and Zyban®)and
hydroxypropyl methylcellulose (HPMC) were limited to the specific
examples in the patent and, because Andrx's products use a lower
molecular weight bupropion hydrochloride and a lower viscosity HPMC,
Andrx's products did not infringe Glaxo's patent.29 While during the
prosecution of the Glaxo patent the patent was restricted to the specific
use of HPMC, the patent was not restricted to specific molecular weights
of or viscosities of HPMC.3 ° Therefore, the Federal Circuit found that
the district court erred in limiting the claims to specific examples in the
patent.3 '
Patent claims do not ordinarily import claim limitations from industry
standards. In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3COM Corp.,3 2 the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court's construction of the patentee's claims,
which limited the claimed "electronic multifunction card" to industry
standard dimensions. 3 The district court decided that the ordinary
meaning of the term "card" should be limited to the standard credit card
size as the context and object of the patent was to provide a method and
device for substituting a single "electronic multifunction card" for
multiple credit cards.34 Reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit
held that no basis existed in the ordinary meaning of the claim terms to
impose industry standard dimensions because the method steps recited
in the patent claims did not impose any specific dimensional requirements and the patentee inferred that such "cards" could vary in size as
evidenced by the use of the terms "simple form" and "normally" when
describing the dimension of credit cards.35

26.
2003).
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1226, 1233 (Fed. Cir.
344 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1227-28.
Id. at 1231-32.
Id. at 1230.
Id. at 1233.
343 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1365.
Id. at 1366-67.
Id. at 1370-71.
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The term "about," which is ubiquitous in patent claims, may be
constructed to include a range of experimental error. 6 In BJ Services
Co. v. Halliburton Energy Services,37 the Federal Circuit held that a
patent claim including the term "about" was not indefinite and
encompassed a range of experimental error.3 8 BJ Services Company's
patent, directed to a method of fracturing subterranean formations to
stimulate oil and gas wells, included a claim limitation to forming a base
fluid by blending a guar polymer having carboxymethyl substituents and
a C* value of "about 0.06" percent by weight.3 9 In concluding that the
term "about" was not indefinite and included a range of experimental
error, the court found sufficient evidence that persons of ordinary skill
in the art could understand the bounds of the patent claim and that the
term "about" encompassed a degree of experimental error.40
Additionally, a limitation from the specification may not be imported
into the claims even if it is shown as part of a preferred embodiment and
In Resonate Inc. v. Alteon
as a solution to a prior art problem. 4
Websystems, Inc.,42 the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's
judgment of noninfringement that read limitations into a claim from a
preferred embodiment when the claim language was broader than that
embodiment.4 3 In Resonate, the patent claim, which related to a
method of routing Internet traffic, was constructed by the district court
to require that the data be transmitted back to the client, bypassing the
load balancer as shown in the preferred embodiment and as a solution
to a prior art problem, even though the patent claim itself did not
require the transmission to bypass the load balancer." The Federal
Circuit held that the bypass feature was not properly a limitation of the
claim and that the alleged infringer, who did not have the bypass
feature, could infringe the patent claim.45
An Information Disclosure Statement ("IDS"), which contains a list
submitted to the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
of the prior art known to the applicant, does not inherently limit the

36.
2003).
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., 338 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
338 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1373.
Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1373-74.
See Resonate Inc. v. Alteon Websystems, Inc., 338 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
338 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1365-66.
Id.
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patent claims.'
In Abbott Laboratories v. Baxter Pharmaceutical
Products,47 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's restrictive
construction of the claim limitation "effective amount."48 The patent
claimed compositions and methods of preventing the degradation of a
sevoflurane anesthetic by adding an "effective amount" of certain Lewis
acid inhibitors.49 The district court construed the term "effective
amount" to mean greater than 130 ppm of water because an IDS filed in
connection with the application disclosed a sevoflurane that included no
more than 130 ppm of water.50 In reversing the district court, the
Federal Circuit noted that an IDS is not construed to be an admission
that the information cited is material to the patentability of the
invention and for that reason, the applicant's disclosure to the USPTO
in the IDS did not itself relinquish effective amounts below 130 ppm of
water.5 ' The Federal Circuit construed the term "effective amount"
according to its ordinary and customary meaning, as neither the
specification nor the plain language of the claim was more restrictive.52
Finally, a patent application may be limited to a single embodiment
in complex art groups.5" In Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Laboratories,54 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's claim construction limiting
the patent to the single disclosed embodiment.5 5 The Federal Circuit
concluded that (1) the district court properly narrowed the patent claims
to the preferred embodiment in the specification directed to the use of a
single DNA construct to introduce the linked human interferon gene and
marker gene into a Chinese mouse for production in the ovarian cells;
and (2) the patent claims did not include an embodiment using the
"unlinked co-transformation" when multiple genes are introduced using
separate DNA constructs or separate vectors.5" The court rejected the
argument that general statements in the specification to an "unlinked"
embodiment were enough to allow the embodiment to fall within the
scope of the patent on the basis that the art was too complex to be
enabling on such statements.57 Further, because the USPTO examiner

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., 334 F.3d 1274, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
334 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1276-77.
Id. at 1277.
Id. at 1279 (citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2000) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.97(h) (2000)).
Id. at 1280.
See Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Labs., 318 F.3d 1132, 1136-37 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
318 F.3d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1136-37.
Id.
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stated in the reasons for allowance5 8 that the patent application was
examined viewing the single embodiment as the invention and because
the applicant did not provide any enabling description of an "unlinked"
embodiment, the Federal Circuit determined that the patent claims
could only support the single embodiment.5 9
B.

Doctrine of Equivalents

Even if a potential infringer does not infringe the literal limitations of
a patent claim, the potential infringer still can infringe a patent through
the Doctrine of Equivalents ("DOE"). The DOE recognizes that claim
language is imperfect and grants a patent claim a certain range of
equivalents of the structures or steps in the claim. While the scope of
equivalents is determined by a number of factors and principles, the
prosecution history ° of a patent can have a crucial role in the ultimate
scope of equivalents. Now that the Supreme Court breathed new life
into the DOE in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co.,61 the Federal Circuit must elucidate how the DOE will affect the
scope of a patent.
62
Starting with Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
on remand from the Supreme Court,63 the Federal Circuit held that a
patent holder can now rebut the presumption that it surrendered the
entire territory between the original claim limitation and the amended
claim limitation by demonstrating that the accused equivalents would
have been unforeseeable to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of amendments.'
In the original case, the Federal Circuit
concluded as a matter of law that the patentee could not rebut the
presumption that because an amendment that narrowed the literal scope
of the claim was made for substantial reasons of patentability, prosecution history estoppel was applicable, preventing the patentee from
asserting any range of equivalents.65 After the Supreme Court's recent

58. Such a statement generally is made by the examiner during the prosecution of
patent application and indicates his reason or reasons for allowing the patent application
or claims.
59. 318 F.3d at 1136-38.
60. The prosecution history is the written record of the give and take between the
applicant and the USPTO during the patent application stage.
61. 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1705 (S. Ct. 2002). See also Laurence P. Colton & Nigamnarayan
Acharya, Intellectual Property, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1601, 1605 (2003).
62. 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
63. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
64. 344 F.3d at 1366.
65. Id. at 1367-68.
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decision,6" however, the Federal Circuit held on remand that a patentee
is now entitled to rebut the presumption "that an 'unexplained'
narrowing amendment surrendered the entire territory between the
original and the amended claim limitations." 7 Specifically, the court
held that factual questions existed as to whether the equivalent in
question was at the time of the amendment unforeseeable and still
available to the patentee. 8 This holding is very important because it
reverses the narrowing trend the Federal Circuit was following when
interpreting patents and patent claim language.
Next, an applicant's rewriting of a claim in independent form based on
allowable claims is considered a narrowing amendment and results in
estoppel.69 In Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., ° the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that a patentee's
narrowing amendment for reasons related to patentability precluded it
from relying on the DOE to prove that the patent was infringed. 7
Ranbaxy concerned a patent on a process in which a "highly polar
organic solvent is selected from the group consisting of a sulfoxide, an
amide and formic acid" and the allegedly infringing process used acetic
acid instead. 2 The patent application originally was filed with one
independent claim and nine dependant claims of which four claims
(including the independent claim) were rejected as indefinite and obvious
over a prior art reference disclosing the use of acetone and water.73
After finding that an amendment that rewrote the allowable dependent
claims in independent form was related to patentability, as it was in
response to a prior art rejection, and that acetic acid would have been
a foreseeable equivalent to sulfoxide, amide and formic acid at the time

66. The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding that prosecution history
estoppel surrenders the entire range of equivalents. 535 U.S. at 741. The Court
enumerated the three ways in which the patentee may overcome the presumption that the
entire range of equivalents was surrendered: by demonstrating that (1) "the equivalent
[would] have been unforeseeable at the time of the [amendment]," (2) "the rationale
underlying the amendment [bore] no more than a tangential relation to the equivalent in
question," or (3) "there [was] some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not
reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in question." Id. at
740-41.
67. 344 F.3d at 1366.
68. Id. at 1374.
69. See Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 350 F.3d 1235, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
70. 350 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
71. Id. at 1238-39.
72. Id. at 1238.
73. Id. at 1237-38.
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of patenting, the court held that the patent owner
was not entitled to a
74
range of equivalents that included acetic acid.
The Federal Circuit decided two other cases that help elucidate
whether an equivalent is foreseeable. First, in PioneerMagnetics, Inc.
v. Micro Linear Corp.,75 the Federal Circuit, on remand from the
Supreme Court, held that equivalents surrendered as a result of
prosecution history estoppel could be "foreseeable" relative to the prior
art at the time of the amendment.76 Second, in Talbert Fuel Systems
Patents Co. v. Unocal Corp. ,7 the Federal Circuit, also on remand from
the Supreme Court, held that when the prior art embraces the alleged
equivalent and a narrowing amendment was made to avoid that
equivalent, the alleged equivalent cannot be found to have been
unforeseeable at the time of the amendment.7 8 Based on these two
cases, an equivalent is unforeseeable only if it relates to new technology.
C.

Patent Invalidity

Patent invalidity is a powerful counterclaim or defense to patent
infringement. A patent can be invalid for numerous technical and
substantive reasons. Discussed below are just a few of the most
interesting cases the Federal Circuit decided in the past year (generally
in favor of upholding the patent) in which the validity of the patent was
at issue.
A patented invention need not meet a customer's standards to be
valid.79 In CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup International Corp.,"° the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court's invalidation of a patent directed to
a semiconductor wafer cleaning system that required significant
experimentation to carry out the invention to meet a customer's
standards for wafer cleanliness." The parties agreed that the preamble term "cleaning" meant only "removal of contaminants" and the
patent disclosed a method able to remove contaminants. Defendants
argued that the patent was not enabling as it did not disclose the
inventors' significant experimentation, including hundreds of modifications, to install a machine executing the method (called a Full Flow

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 1241.
330 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See id. at 1352.
347 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See id. at 1355.
See CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int'l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
349 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1336-37.

1336

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

machine) that met the customer's standards for wafer cleanliness. s2
The court rejected this argument and held that the enablement
requirement does not require a commercial embodiment or an invention
that meets
a customer's standards absent specific language in the
83
claims.
Next, a patent for metabolites of a known drug may be invalid because
the metabolite inherently may be disclosed in the patent for the known
drug.8 4 In Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,"8 the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Schering's
patent covering a metabolite descarboethoxyloratadine ("DCL") of the
antihistamine loradine was invalid as anticipated by Schering's expired
patent on loradine itself.8 While the court recognized that a person of
ordinary skill in the art might not recognize the disclosure of DCL, the
court found that the expired loradine patent inherently discloses DCL
because DCL is the natural result flowing from the expired patent."
While the court invalidated the DCL patent, it noted patent protection
with proper claiming could be available for metabolites of known
drugs.88
Further, an applicant's own patent listed in an IDS does not inherently invalidate the applicant's subsequent patent.8 9 In Riverwood
InternationalCorp. v. R. A. Jones & Co.,' the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court's invalidation of the patents-in-suit based on obviousness over the applicant's own parent patent.9 ' Because the applicant
cited the parent patent in an IDS as "prior art" during the prosecution
of the patents-in-suit, the defense argued that the parent patent was
prior art by admission. 92 The Federal Circuit held that citing the
parent patent in an IDS would not make the patent prior art by
admission because the doctrine that a reference can become prior art by
admission is inapplicable when the subject matter at issue is the
inventor's own work.93

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 1338.
Id.
See Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
339 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1374-75.
Id. at 1378.
Id. at 1381.
See Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
324 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1348.
Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1354-55.
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Finally, patents covering transgenic animals are not invalidated
through anticipation by prior publications identifying the nature and
location of the claimed gene unless the publications are enabling.9 4 In
Elan Pharmaceuticalsv. Mayo Foundation,95 the Federal Circuit held
on rehearing that patents for transgenic animals harboring amyloid
precursor protein ("APP") having the "Swedish mutation"96 of Alzheimer's disease were not anticipated by a prior art publication identifying
the nature and location of the Swedish mutation in the gene and
suggesting that the gene may have applications to transgenic nonhuman
models.97 The court remanded to the district court the issue of whether
the prior art reference enabled persons of ordinary skill in the art to
make the desired mutated mouse without undue experimentation.9"
D.

ProceduralIssues

Aside from substantive issues of patent law, the Federal Circuit
resolved three procedural issues that directly affect patent enforcement.
Often the Federal Circuit also reports precedents that bind district
courts in procedural issues in patent cases.
First, the federal courts have inherent ancillary jurisdiction to enforce
consent judgments related to patent cases. In Cygnus Telecommunications Technology, LLC v. totalaxcess.com, Inc.,99 the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's order dismissing an action to enforce a
consent judgment for lack of jurisdiction."0 After the patent holder
settled a patent infringement action with a consent decree requiring the
infringer and its successor to pay $50,000 to the patent holder, a
successor bought the infringer and the patent holder brought a
subsequent action to enforce the judgment against the successor.'
Rejecting the claim that the original patent-based ground of federal
jurisdiction was not available against the successor, the court held that
the federal district court had inherent ancillary jurisdiction to enforce its

94. "Enablement" is the requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003) that the patent
disclosure must give a sufficiently clear explanation of the invention so that a person of
ordinary skill in the art can make and use the invention without undue experimentation.
95. 346 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
96. The Swedish mutation is an abnormal gene n2 that was discovered on chromosome
21 in a Swedish family that has an unusually high incidence of early-onset Alzheimer's
disease.
97. 346 F.3d at 1054.
98. Id. at 1057.
99. 345 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
100. Id. at 1373-74.
101. Id. at 1377.
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judgments, even to the extent of 0 determining
the liability of the
2
successor under the consent decree.1
Second, in Mazzari v. Rogan,' the Federal Circuit held that
evidence presented in a district court after an appeal from a decision of
the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI") °4 requires a
de novo review by the district court and a "clear error" standard of
review by the Federal Circuit.'0 5 In this case, the applicants filed for
a 35 U.S.C. § 145106 review of the BPAI's decision of obviousness to the
district court." 7 Because the applicant provided additional evidence
that was conflicting with the BPAI's finding, the Federal Circuit held
that the district court properly reviewed conflicting evidence de
novo.'0 5 Further, as the district court's determinations are subject to
the decision in Zurko,' °9 these determinations are then reviewed under
a "clear error" standard by the Federal Circuit.1 °
Third, offensive collateral estoppel may not be available to a patentee
that did not join a previous lawsuit."' In Dana v. E.S. Originals,
Inc.,112 the Federal Circuit vacated the district court's judgment that
the defendants were collaterally estopped 113 (offensively) from contest-

102. Id. at 1373-75.
103. 323 F.3d 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
104. The BPAI is an administrative board that is part of the USPTO and hears appeals
from USPTO examiners' decisions rejecting the patentability of claims of inventions and
questions of patentability and priority between rival claimants of the same inventions.
105. 323 F.3d at 1005.
106. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2003). Review under 35 U.S.C. § 145 is distinct from a 35 U.S.C.
§ 141 (2003) appeal in that it affords the applicant an opportunity to present additional
evidence or argue the previous evidence afresh.
107. 323 F.3d at 1003-04.
108. Id. at 1004.
109. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999) (holding that decisions and findings of fact
by the USPTO are reviewed, whether by the court of appeals or the district court, under
a substantial evidence standard of review).
110. 323 F.3d at 1005.
111. See Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
112. 342 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
113.
A party asking the court to apply collateral estoppel must establish that: "(1) the
issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue
was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the determination of the issue
in the prior litigation must have been a critical and necessary part of the
judgment in the first action; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is
asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
proceeding." On procedural issues not unique to the circuit's exclusive jurisdiction, the court applies the law of the regional circuit.
Id. at 1323 (quoting Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir.
1998)).
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ing the issues of infringement and validity of patents relating to certain
footwear featuring flashing light displays in a proceeding against the
patentee because these issues were raised and decided in a previous suit
brought by the patent assignee.114 In a previous decision against
defendants entered by a California federal court and brought by the
assignee for infringement after the assignment, the court found that the
patent was valid and infringed by defendants.'15 While defendants
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and the incentive to litigate
the issues of infringement and validity in the California case, the
Federal Circuit held that in the interest of fairness the question whether
the patentee should be collaterally estopped if the patentee could have
joined the California case is a material fact to be determined by the
lower court. 6
E.

Inequitable Conduct

Inequitable conduct is fraudulent conduct by a patent applicant or its
attorneys during the prosecution of the patent in the USPTO that may
result in the invalidation of the entire issued patent." ' The inequitable conduct analysis is performed in two steps: (1) a determination of
whether the withheld reference meets a threshold level of materiality
and intent to mislead; and (2) a weighing of the materiality and intent
in light of all the circumstances to determine whether the applicant's
118
conduct is so culpable that the patent should be held unenforceable.
This analysis is performed on a case-by-case basis.
First, an adverse USPTO office action" 9 in one pending patent
application is material to the patentability of another copending related
patent application. 20 In Dayco Products, Inc. v. Total Containment,
Inc.,1 21 the Federal Circuit, reversing the district court's summary
judgment of infringement, held that a patent may be unenforceable due

114. Id. at 1321-22. Even though the patentee assigned the patent to LA Gear, the
patentee reserved the right to sue infringers for infringement during the pre-assignment
period. Id. at 1322.
115. Id. at 1321-22.
116. Id. at 1327.
117. See, e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
118. Id.
119. An "office action" is an official written communication from the USPTO, typically
from the examiner, relating to the patent application.
120. See Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
121. 329 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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to inequitable conduct 122 during prosecution. 2 3 During the prosecution of the patents-in-suit 24 directed to flexible hoses and coupling
assemblies that connect to each other for use in underground gas
containment systems, two copending patents were directed to and
examined by two separate examiners. Not only did the applicant fail to
disclose the existence of the copending applications to the examiners, but
the applicant also failed to provide the examiner of one of the applications with the adverse office actions rendered by the other examiner in
connection with the other application." 2 The Federal Circuit held that
the adverse office action of the copending application met the threshold
materiality test of any information that a reasonable examiner would be
substantially likely to consider important in deciding whether to allow
an application to issue as a patent. 2 6 The court remanded the case to
the district court
to determine whether the applicant intended to deceive
127
the USPTO.
Second, the payment of small entity fees, when large entity fees must
be paid, 128 is not inequitable conduct without the intent to deceive the
USPTO."2 s In Ulead Systems, Inc. v. Lex Computer & Management
Corp.,130 the Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment finding
of inequitable conduct (holding the patent unenforceable and expired),
where the patent owner falsely claimed small entity status and paid
insufficient maintenance fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285.13 1 In Ulead

122.
"T]o prove inequitable conduct in the prosecution of a patent, [the defendant]
must provide evidence of affirmative misrepresentations of a material fact, failure
to disclose material information, or submission of false material information,
coupled with an intent to deceive." Both intent and materiality are questions of
fact that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 1362 (quoting Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boebringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted)).
123. Id. at 1360.
124. Id. "The patents-in-suit [are four patents that] all claim priority through a string
of continuation applications to U.S. Application No. 408,161 ['the '161 application'] filed on
September 15, 1989, and include identical figures and substantially identical written
descriptions. The '161 application issued as U.S. Patent No. 5,037,143 . .. ." Id.
125. Id. at 1361-62.
126. Id. at 1364-67, 1369.
127. Id. at 1371.
128. A "small entity" under the USPTO rules is a small business concern, independent
inventor, or non-profit organization. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.9(f) (1993). A small entity may pay
reduced prosecution and maintenance fees. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.16-18.
129. See Ulead Sys., Inc. v. Lex Computer & Mgmt. Corp., 351 F.3d 1139, 1150 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).
130. 351 F.3d 1139 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
131. Id. at 1141; 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2003).
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Systems, the patent owner's general counsel was aware of licenses to
large entities but unaware of their effect on maintenance fees, and the
patent owner's patent counsel was aware of the effect of assignments to
a large entity but unaware that rights had been assigned to a large
entity.132 The court held that the grant of summary judgment was
improper because a material fact remained as to the owner's intent to

deceive. 133
F

Exceptional Cases

The Patent Act under 35 U.S.C. § 28513 4 provides that a court, in
"exceptional" cases, may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party.3 Courts have repeatedly identified as "exceptional" those cases
involving inequitable conduct before the USPTO, litigation misconduct,
bad faith litigation, a frivolous suit, or willful infringement. Whether a
case is "exceptional" is determined on a case-by-case basis.
First, continued prosecution of a lawsuit after the claims have been
constructed to preclude infringement is "exceptional.""3 6 In Phonometrics, Inc. v. Westin Hotel Co.,1 7 the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision to award fees and costs based on the patent
holder's continued maintenance of the action after an appellate decision
in a related action established that the patent had specific limitations,
was vexatious, supported an inference of bad faith, and resulted in
unjustified multiplication of proceedings.'38 The patentee had sued
many defendants for infringement relating to its patent for an electronic
long distance telephone call computer and recorder.'39 The Federal
Circuit in a prior decision 40 construed the patent claims such that a
defendant had to provide real-time visual displays showing the costs of
4
the call to the caller during the call in order to infringe the patent.1 1
Because the patent holder never accused the defendant of violating the
patent as established in the prior decision, the court found that the

132. 351 F.3d at 1142-43.
133. Id. at 1144, 1150.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
135. Id.
136. See Phonometrics, Inc. v. Westin Hotel Co., 350 F.3d 1242, 1245 (Fe. Cir. 2003).
137. 350 F.3d 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
138. Id. at 1242.
139. Id. at 1243.
140. See, e.g., Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1992);
Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom, Inc., 133 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
141. 350 F.3d at 1245.
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maintenance of the action was exceptional
under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and
142
warranted the award of fees and costs.
Second, pre-litigation misconduct is not "exceptional" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 285.'43 In Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,'" the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the case was
exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285 for alleged pretrial misconduct. 4 '
Abbott encouraged Forest in the development of Infasurfl as an
alternative until it received FDA approval for Survanta®, knowing that
Infasurf@ would violate its purchased patents. Forest argued that the
case was "exceptional" because Abbott should have recognized that its
pre-litigation conduct precluded it from bringing suit. 146 The Federal
Circuit held that, while the conduct was bad faith business conduct, such
conduct (not being litigation conduct) alone was not enough to rise to the
level of "exceptional" under 35 U.S.C. § 285.141
Third, an action brought on a valid patent, without more, is not bad
faith litigation. 4 ' In McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co., 149 the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's finding that the case was
exceptional. 5 ° After invalidating the patent holder McNeil-PPC, Inc.'s
patents relating to the combination of its antidiarrheal drug loperamide
with the anti-gas drug simethicone (in order to treat both diarrhea and
flatulence) based on obviousness over its previous patents for each of the
drugs and other prior art references, the district court found that the
case was exceptional because the drug company engaged in "a scheme
for extending the life of a drug about to go off patent ... without the
slightest regard for the intent and purposes of the patent laws."'5 1 The
Federal Circuit noted that an inventor has a right to vigorously
prosecute patents on its inventions and that patents are presumed to be
valid and concluded the patent holder bringing the infringement action
based on issued patents, without more, is not a basis for finding a case
exceptional within 35 U.S.C. § 285.152

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
339 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1326-27.
Id. at 1330-31.
See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo Co., 337 F.3d 1362, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
337 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1364.
Id. at 1367 (citing the district court's opinion).
Id. at 1373.
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Contributory Infringement

Contributory or induced infringement is the act of selling or supplying
an item for which the only or predominant use is in connection with a
patented invention.'53 In a case of alleged induced patent infringement, the patent holder must show that the alleged contributory
infringer's actions induced infringing acts and that she knew or should
have known her actions would induce actual infringements.1 4 Absent
direct infringement of the claims of a patent, there can be neither
contributory infringement nor inducement of infringement. 5
The
Federal Circuit decided two cases in which contributory or induced
infringement was at issue.
First, in Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc.,'56 the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's summary judgment of noninfringement
through contributory infringement of a patent claiming a method of
ingesting the combination of folic acid and vitamin B12 to treat or
prevent macrocytic-megaloblastic anemia.1 5 '
More specifically, the
Federal Circuit determined that the alleged infringer's customers, who
bought defendant's over-the-counter dietary supplement containing folic
acid and vitamin B12,15" did not take the supplement with the intent
of treating macrocytic-megaloblastic anemia as required by the patent
claim.'59 Without the required intent to treat the anemia by the
patent claim (i.e. direct infringement), the customers did not infringe the
patent claim, and defendant did not engage in contributory infringement
of the patent."0
Second, in Anton/Bauer, Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 6 ' the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction of induced
or contributory infringement of a patent claim for a connection that
joined a battery pack to a camera through the use of a female plate

153. See, e.g., Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
154. See
155. See Met-Coil System Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc. 803 F.2d 684 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
156. 342 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
157. Id. at 1335.
158. Id. at 1331. The product was labeled and advertised for use in maintenance of
proper blood homocysteine levels and not for the prevention or treatment of macrocyticmegaloblastic anemia. Id.
159. Id. at 1333.
160. Id. at 1334.
161. 329 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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attached to the camera and a male plate attached to a battery pack. 162
Interestingly, the patent holder, Anton/Bauer, manufactures and sells
both female plates and battery packs containing male plates. But
instead of selling the combination of a female plate and a male plate as
claimed in the patent, it sells its female plates directly to members of
the portable television video camera industry, who attach the female
plates to commercial portable television video cameras. The patent
holder sued alleging that defendant's battery pack, which also can be
used in combination with the patentee's female plates as the housing of
the battery pack that contains a male plate, alleging that defendant's
battery pack would induce infringement and/or contribute to the
infringement of the patent by the patentee's customers.'o In reversing
the district court, the Federal Circuit held that an implied license to
practice the patent claim was granted by the patentee to its customers
to employ the combination by the patent holder's sale of the female plate
because the female plate could only be used in the patented combination
and the combination had to be completed by the purchaser.' 64 Thus,
the court found that there could not be not direct infringement by the
patentee's consumers and consequently there
could not be inducement
165
or contributory infringement by defendant.
H.

Miscellaneous Issues

Finally, several side issues in patent law were clarified in some
interesting decisions.
First, the specification for means-plus-function claims6 must clearly
link the means and the function of the respective element. 6 7 In
Medical Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB,168 the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motion
for judgment as a matter of law that their products did not infringe the
patents after finding that the patent specification did not clearly link the
structure in the claim element to the corresponding function of the claim
element.'69 The court found that there was nothing in the specification

162. Id. at 1346.
163. Id. at 1347.
164. Id. at 1352.
165. Id.
166. A "means-plus-function claim" recites a means for performing a specified function
rather than reciting a specific element for performing the function. The goal is to protect
a variety of elements rather than a specific element.
167. See Micro Chem. Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
168. 344 F.3d 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
169. Id. at 1207.
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related to a system for planning surgical treatment that indicated that
a claimed "means for converting said plurality images into a selected
format" could include software, even though one of ordinary skill in the
art would know that software can perform the specified conversion
function.17 ° Because the specification did not expressly link the means
or steps for performing the specified function with the specified structure
as required under 35 U.S.C. § 112171 and plaintiff conceded that claim
the court instructed the district
construction was the only material issue,
172
court to enter judgment for defendant.
Second, a patentee may disclaim certain matters in a patent by taking
such a position even if it is not clear that such a position was relied
upon by the USPTO. 173 In Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo
Industry,174 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of no
patent infringement on the grounds that the patentee had disclaimed the
matter at issue. 75 The prosecution history of the patent relating to a
method for cutting window bindings in a "cut-down" showed that the
applicant amended the claims and argued in an attempt to overcome a
prior art rejection. After the examiner rejected the amendment and
argument, the applicant reiterated the arguments and further argued
that the patent application predated the reference, which ultimately may
The court
have caused the examiner to issue a notice of allowance.'
held that the applicant's position during prosecution serves as public
subject matter and supported a restrictive claim
notice of disclaimed
77
construction. 1
Finally, the patent laws do not foreclose an unjust enrichment
In University of Colorado Foundation, Inc. v. American
claim. 78
Cyanamid Co., 1 79 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
judgment against the patentee for fraudulent nondisclosure, unjust
In obtaining a
enrichment, and exemplary monetary damages.8 0
patent for a reformation of a prenatal multivitamin/mineral supplement,

170. Id. at 1208, 1222.
171. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
172. 344 F.3d at 1222.
173. See Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, Inc., 222 F.3d 951,957 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
174. 323 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
175. Id. at 996.
176. Id. at 994.
177. Id. at 995.
178. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 F.3d 1366, 1371-72 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
179. 342 F.3d 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
180. Id. at 1300.
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the patentee directly copied tables and significant portions of the
inventors' confidential manuscript.' 8' Because the patent was obtained
through a fraudulent disclosure of inventorship that could not be
corrected under 35 U.S.C. § 2546, the district court found that the patent
would not be enforceable.R 2 Because the inventors' claim for unjust
enrichment was not simply an attempt to enforce property rights, it did
not undermine the purposes of the federal patent scheme and did not
prevent the public from using the ideas of the now invalidated patent." 3 Therefore, the United States Patent Laws do not preclude an
unjust enrichment award and damages.'4
III.

TRADEMARK CASES

Precedent trademark cases for Georgia come from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the United States Supreme
Court,8 5 and the Georgia appellate courts. Generally speaking, the
most relevant and interesting cases come from the federal courts. Four
interesting cases in the field of trademark were decided by the Eleventh
Circuit or Supreme Court.
First, in Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Goody's Family Clothing,
Inc., '8 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia held that Goody's violated Hilfiger's trademark rights and that
Hilfiger was entitled to an award of treble profits and reasonable
attorney fees and costs. 8 ' After finding an extensive list of facts
including that Goody's sold counterfeit t-shirts and jeans with labels
similar to Hilfiger's trademarks, the court held that Goody's acted with
willful blindness in purchasing the counterfeit t-shirts and that Goody's
merchandise infringed Hilfiger's trademarks.'
Because the court
found that Goody's acted willfully, Hilfiger was entitled to treble profits

181. Id. at 1303.
182. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D.
Colo. 2000).
183. 342 F.3d at 1305-06.
184. Id. at 1308.
185. While the Eleventh Circuit generally provides the controlling case law for Georgia,
the Federal Circuit does pronounce the controlling case law in connection with registration
and cancellation of trademarks. Due to the space limitation of this Article, the trademark
cases from the Federal Circuit have been omitted.
186. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8788 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
187. Id. at *115-16.
188. Id. at *57.
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under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b)189 or, alternatively, was entitled to an award
of statutory damages.190
More particularly, the court, applying the Eleventh Circuit's multifactored balancing standard,' 9' determined that Goody's jeans created
a likelihood of consumer confusion relative to Hilfiger's trademarks.1 92
Applying the well-established standard, the court found that (1)
Hilfiger's flag design trademark was an arbitrary mark193 because it
bears no direct relation to the designated clothing line; (2) the marks
used by Hilfiger and Goody's were very similar in appearance; (3) the
products sold by Hilfiger and Goody's are identical as both parties sold
jeans and jean shorts; (4) Hilfiger and Goody's have similar retail outlets
and customers, and both parties market to consumers interested in
purchasing apparel and jeans (rejecting Goody's argument that its
consumers are value consumers and Hilfiger's consumers are high-end
consumers); (5) Hilfiger and Goody's employ dissimilar advertising media
in that Hilfiger employs national magazines, high-circulation newspapers, and national television broadcasts, while Goody's employs local,
low-circulation newspapers, and local television and radio advertising;
(6) Goody's intended to infringe Hilfiger's trademark as Goody's intended
to copy Hilfiger's trademarks and derive benefit from Hilfiger's
reputation; and (7) no consumers were actually confused by Goody's use
of its mark.'
Evaluating the overall balance of these seven factors and in particular
finding that factors (1), (2), (3), (4), and (6) weighed in favor of a finding
of a likelihood of confusion, the court found that Goody's use of its mark
on denim products would likely cause confusion with Hilfiger's flag
design trademark.'9 5 After finding that Goody's use of the mark was
likely to cause confusion, the court held that the case was "exceptional"

189. 15 U.S.C. § 117(b) (2003).
190. Id. at *115.
191. The court must evaluate and weigh seven factors to determine, as a matter of fact,
whether consumers are likely to confuse defendant's product with plaintiff's product,
namely: (1) the type of mark; (2) the similarity of the marks; (3) the similarity of products
the marks represent; (4) the similarity of the parties's retail outlets and customers; (5) the
similarity of advertising media; (6) the defendant's intent; and (7) whether any consumers
were actually confused by the marks. Id. at *79.
192. Id. at *101.
193. There are four categories of marks: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; and
(4) arbitrary. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992). These four
categories form a continuum that ranges from generic terms, the weakest and not entitled
to protection, to arbitrary marks, the strongest and most protectable. Id.
194. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8788, at *101.
195. Id.
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for the purpose 196
of awarding lost profits and attorney fees under 15
U.S.C. § 1117(a).
Second, in Dastar Corp. v. 7ventieth Century Fox Film Corp.,'9 7 the
United States Supreme Court held that section 42(a) of the Lanham
Act 9 ' does not prevent the unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation ("Fox") brought an
work.9
action alleging that using a public domain uncopyrighted work without
proper credit to the originators constituted "reverse passing off" or
falsely designating "origin" in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act. 20 While Fox also brought an action for copyright infringement,
the Supreme Court expressed no opinion on that claim because it was
still subject to extensive litigation.20 '
The facts of Dastarare interesting. Doubleday published a World War
II book titled "General Dwight D. Eisenhower," obtained a copyright
registration on the book, and granted exclusive television rights to an
affiliate of Fox. Fox approved Time, Inc. to produce a television series
called "Crusade in Europe" based on the book, and Time obtained a
copyright registration on its television series and ultimately assigned it
to Fox. Interestingly, while Doubleday renewed the copyright registration on the book, Fox did not renew the copyright on the television
series. As such, the copyright on the television series expired leaving
the television series in the public domain. Fox eventually reacquired the
television rights in the book including the exclusive right to distribute
the Crusade television series and licensed SFM Entertainment and New
Line Home Video, Inc. to manufacture and distribute Crusade on video.
Shortly thereafter, Dastar began distributing a video set called World
War II Campaigns in Europe that was made from tapes of the original
version of the Crusade television series. Subsequently, Fox brought suit
claiming that Dastar was falsely designating the "origin" of the video
sets as it claimed it produced the sets. 0 2
In holding that section 43 of the Lanham Act does not prevent the
unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work, the Court held that no
false designation of origin was shown since the phrase "origin of goods"
as used in section 43(a) did not connote the person or entity that
originated the ideas contained in the video, and instead referred only to

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at *112-13.
123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2003).
123 S. Ct. at 2049.
Id. at 2044-45.
Id. at 2045 n.2.
Id. at 2044.
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the producer's tangible video product. 2 3 The Court stated that the
term "origin" indicates no consequence to consumers as to whether the
producer was the source of the ideas in the video and the expression
presented by the original product could have been protected by Fox by
renewing its copyright registration. 20 4 Further, the Court noted that
it would be burdensome to producers to determine the actual originator
of the ideas expressed in books or other material and that reading
"origin" any broader would extend copyright rights to one who no longer
possesses them.20 5 As section 43(a) was intended to protect consumers
from misleading designations of origin and not to protect creativity or
originality, Dastar did not violate section 43 by listing itself as the
source of the actual video.20 8
Finally, in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,2" 7 the United States
Supreme Court held that trademark owners of famous marks are
required to show actual dilution rather than a likelihood of dilution.20 8
In the trademark field, the general rule is that more than one unrelated
party can use the same trademark on disparate goods or services as long
as there is no likelihood of consumer confusion. 20 9 Dilution is a
relatively recent concept that protects famous trademarks across product
lines in contrast to the general rule.210 Moseley opened a small adult
novelty store named "Victor's Secret," which it changed to "Victor's Little
Secrets" upon receiving a cease and desist letter from Victoria's
Secret. 2 ' Despite the name change, Victoria's Secret, which sells
women's lingerie in over 750 stores, filed a dilution claim under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act,2" 2 alleging that that the mark
"Victor's Little Secret" was likely to "blur and erode" the distinctiveness
and "tarnish" the reputation of its famous mark VICTORIA'S SECRET.2" 3 Victoria's Secret, however, did not provide evidence of any
lessening of the capacity of its trademark to identify and distinguish its

203. Id. at 2047.
204. Id. at 2049.
205. Id. at 2047.
206. Id. at 2049.
207. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
208. Id. at 433.
209. Id. at 428. This rule is why we have Delta® faucets and Delta Air Lines®.
210. Id. at 429. Dilution is why you likely will not see any products or services with
the Coca-Cola® or Rolls Royce@ mark on them that do not come from The Coca-Cola
Company or The Rolls Royce Company, as these marks are considered famous.
211. Id. at 423.
212. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2003).
213. 537 U.S. at 423-24. The Victor's Little Secret storeowners did not challenge the
claim that the trademark owners' mark was famous, which is required for a claim under
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. Id. at 425.
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goods or services on the allegation that obtaining proof of actual dilution
is expensive and often unreliable.214
In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Federal Dilution Act
requires proof of actual dilution or actual injury to the economic value
of the famous mark when the junior mark is not identical to the famous
mark. 15 The Court noted that unlike trademark infringement claims,
dilution claims are not intended to protect consumers. 1 6 So when the
marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally
associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to
establish actionable dilution because such mental association will not
necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods
of its owner.217 When the junior mark is identical to the famous mark,
the Court stated that this may be enough to circumstantially prove
actual dilution. 2 "
Because Victoria's Secret did not present any
evidence of actual dilution and the marks were not identical, the Court
held that Victoria's Secret could not sustain its dilution claim. 1 9
IV.

COPYRIGHT

During 2003, while other federal circuits throughout the United States
appear to have been busy with copyright cases, the Eleventh Circuit did
not decide any copyright cases. Thus, the only additional copyright case
binding or covering Georgia is gleaned from the United States Supreme
Court.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft,220 the Supreme Court held that the Copyright
Term Extension Act ("CTEA")22 was constitutional under the First
Amendment 222 and the Copyright Clause223 of the United States
Constitution.2 4 Individuals and businesses who generally build on
post-copyrighted work sued the United States Attorney General,
challenging the constitutionality of the CTEA, which enlarged the
duration of copyrights by twenty years in order to, inter alia, harmonize

214. Id. at 434.
215. Id. at 433.
216. Id. at 429.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 434.
Id.
Id.
537 U.S. 186 (2003).
Pub. L. No. 105-208, §§ 102(b), (d) (2003).

222.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

223. "Congress shall have power to promote the progress of science by securing to
authors for limited times the exclusive right to their writings." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.
8 (emphasis added).
224. 537 U.S. at 193-94.
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the baseline U.S. copyright term with the term adopted by the European
Union.225 Specifically, it was argued that the CTEA violated the
"limited times" prescription of the Copyright Clause and that the CTEA
was a content-neutral regulation of speech that failed inspection under
the heightened judicial scrutiny appropriate for such regulations.2 26
In holding that the CTEA was constitutional, the Court determined
that the CTEA did not violate the Copyright Clause by vitiating the
"limited times" requirement and that such regulations are not subject to
a heightened judicial review.227 Initially, the Court rejected the view
that "limited time[]" meant a time forever "fixed" or "inalterable."2 28
Because the Copyright Clause empowers Congress to enact copyright
laws with the objective of promoting the arts and sciences and Congress
extended the laws for legitimate purposes, the Court held that Congress,
not the courts, must decide how best to pursue this objective.2 29
Further, because Congress has not altered the traditional copyright
protection, only a rational basis was necessary and not heightened First
Amendment scrutiny.2 0 As such, the Court held that the CTEA was
constitutional.23 '

V. FINAL NOTES
The year 2003 has been another active period in the field of intellectual property. Unlike in the recent past when many seminal cases were
handed down deciding specific issues that affected the scope of intellectual property protection, the decisions in 2003 focused more on interpreting, explaining, and applying the holdings of the seminal cases. Thus,
while the past few years caused some upheaval in the intellectual
property laws and much heartburn among intellectual property lawyers,
2003 was a good year for soothing the prior years' ills. The authors
expect 2004 and 2005 to continue the soothing trend of 2003.

225. Id. at 194-96.
226. Id. at 196.
227. Id. at 204.
228. Id. at 199.
229. Id. at 208.
230. Id. at 221.
231. Id. at 222.
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